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I. INTRODUCTION

The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement,
also known as the Wickersham Commission, embodied a moment when
Americans took a deep breath and reopened some basic questions
about criminal law enforcement. This blue-ribbon commission started
its work after years of experimentation in the use of criminal laws to
suppress alcohol.
Prompted by the turmoil of Prohibition, the
Commission surveyed, with a rational and professional eye, the organic
institutions of criminal law enforcement. The Commission found much
room for improvement.
Much of that improvement, in the view of the Commission, could
happen if governments would reassign jobs in the system, changing who
* Needham Y. Gulley Professor of Criminal Law, Wake Forest University. I appreciate
the helpful reactions to these ideas that I received from Beverly Gage, Rachel Harmon,
Tracey Meares, Michael O’Hear, and the other participants in the Marquette University Law
School “Conference on America’s First National Crime Commission and the Federalization
of Law Enforcement.” Katie Hughes and Tori Kepes provided excellent research assistance.
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controls criminal investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. In
particular, the Commission wanted to reduce local control over criminal
prosecution.
If local actors were to play a lesser role in criminal enforcement, who
would take the reins in their place? The Prohibition context for the
Commission reports led to extended investigations of the federal role in
criminal law enforcement. The Commission documented the costs of
federal involvement in criminal justice and offered some conflicting
recommendations on the federal role. This discussion of federal law
enforcement attracted the most attention from readers over the years.
The Commission, however, was clear in its preference for state
control over local control of criminal prosecution. This local-to-state
theme in the Commission reports proved to be a more important
proposal than the local-to-federal theme that held our attention all
along.
In this essay, I focus on the Commission’s reasons for preferring
state control. The report embodied a view of political accountability
that was typical of the day. The influence of politics in criminal
enforcement, for the Wickersham Commission, was tantamount to
corruption. Political influence meant the willingness to ignore technical
competence and the power to achieve favorable outcomes for the
privileged few. Put more bluntly, the Commission viewed local political
control of criminal justice as irrational and corrupt.
After excavating the views of the Wickersham Commission on
shifting control from local government to state government, I ask how
much of the Commission’s vision eventually became a reality. The twopart answer begins with this: some parts of the criminal justice
machinery have in fact slipped away from local government and into the
hands of state government. Indeed, the growth of state influence in
criminal justice has been more important than the more celebrated
“federalization” of criminal law.
The second part of the answer is that certain components of the
criminal justice system have remained under local control, despite the
powerful forces that could have uprooted them. In particular, while
courts and corrections have become primarily state-level functions,
prosecution and policing have stayed within local control.
The staying power of local control—and the fact that local actors
held onto prosecution and police functions but not to other parts of the
criminal justice machinery—reflects a change in our understanding of
politics in criminal justice. The Wickersham Commission’s account of

16 WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

6/23/2013 11:12 AM

LOCAL CONTROL OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

1201

political influence as corrupt and irrational no longer carries the same
persuasive weight. Instead, local voters pull the strings precisely in
those areas of criminal justice where we have the least confidence in the
constraining power of law. Local control shows that we act today on the
basis of a benign view of politics. We still recognize the power of
politics to achieve responsive and constrained criminal justice.
II. THE LOCAL-TO-STATE THEME IN THE COMMISSION REPORT
The Commission published its Report on Prosecution, report number
4, in April 1931. 1 While some of the Commission’s reports were
iconoclastic, this volume embodied the conventional wisdom of the day
among academics and reform-minded lawyers. This was a consensus
document.
The report and a long appendix were drafted with heavy involvement
from commissioner Roscoe Pound, the dean of the Harvard Law School,
and long-time advocate for modernization of criminal justice at the local
2
Pound, along with his colleague Felix Frankfurter, led an
level.
empirical assessment of the criminal justice system in Cleveland ten
3
years before the Wickersham Commission published its report. One of
the researchers and authors in the Cleveland project, Alfred Bettman,
4
also took a leading role in the Wickersham Commission. He authored
an appendix to accompany the Commission’s Report on Prosecution.
The appendix summarized the court and prosecution materials from a
collection of recently published study reports from eighteen jurisdictions
around the country, including Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati,
5
Cleveland, Memphis, Philadelphia, and twelve different states. These
reports were part of a coordinated national effort to update the
institutions and practices of local criminal justice to adapt them to the
1. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION (1931) [hereinafter REPORT ON PROSECUTION].
2. See id. at 38.
3. See RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF
THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN CLEVELAND, OHIO (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
4. Id. Bettman was a Cincinnati lawyer best known for his work in land use planning.
Early in his career he worked as a prosecutor in Ohio. See Laurence C. Gerckens, Bettman of
Cincinnati, in THE AMERICAN PLANNER: BIOGRAPHIES AND RECOLLECTIONS 120, 122, 136
(Donald A. Krueckeberg ed., 1983).
5 . See ALFRED BETTMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SURVEYS ANALYSIS: BEING AN
ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEYS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RELATING
TO THE SUBJECTS OF PROSECUTION AND COURTS FOR NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 47–49 (1931).
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increased volume and other challenges of modern systems. 6 The
Commission described its objectives, in the field of criminal prosecution,
as restating the consensus among experts and reform-minded lawyers, as
reflected in those combined surveys assembled over the previous
decade:
We conceived that an analysis of the information and
recommendations contained in these surveys and a statement of
the lessons which could be drawn from their data and discussions
would afford the most effective means of giving to the American
public something in the nature of a summary of the existing
authoritative knowledge on these subjects and of establishing a
starting point from which some conclusions might be drawn as to
the directions of reform of the administration of criminal justice,
accompanied by an indication of subjects appropriate for
additional research. 7
Although federalism is a recurring theme in the overall work of the
Commission, it plays only a subdued role in the volume on prosecution.
The Wickersham Commission was skeptical of Prohibition,
documenting many of the unanticipated costs that resulted from the
8
sudden criminalization of a widespread activity. At the same time, the
Commission was enthusiastic about federal system organization.
The report holds up the centralized organization of the Department
of Justice as a model for state court prosecutors: “Nowhere is [state]
prosecution as well organized as in the Federal Government, and by and
large the State systems are much less efficient and much less
9
satisfactory.”
The report analogizes the Attorney General in each state to the
United States Attorney General under the 1789 statute that established
10
an earlier and less effective organization of the Department of Justice.
Under this loose organizational scheme, the chief prosecutor in the
jurisdiction holds no effective control over prosecutions: “There is
seldom any effective central superintendence and control of
6. See id. at 45–46; SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 147–48 (2d ed. 1998).
7. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 3.
8. See NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 44–60 (1931)
[hereinafter PROHIBITION REPORT].
9. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 9.
10. Id. at 9–10.
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prosecutions.” 11 A decentralized prosecutorial service in a state, leaving
effective control of case-level prosecution decisions to the local office,
leads to “[w]ant of adequate system and organization in the office of the
12
average prosecutor.”
Instead of this decentralized system, the Wickersham Commission
suggests that prosecutors in each state should answer to the state
Attorney General, giving the chief prosecutor in the state the authority
to organize local offices, to set policies for those offices, and to make
case-level decisions. What worked for the federal prosecutors would
also work for a unified state prosecutorial service.
What would centralization of prosecutors at the state level
accomplish? The Wickersham Commission offers several answers.
A. Removal from Politics and Attendant Corruption
First, the report says, a centralized statewide prosecutorial service
removes the local prosecutor from politics. Local prosecutors, the
13
Commission asserts, “are likely to be deep in politics.” In particular,
the report expresses concern about prosecutors in large cities who
obtain the job through local elections: the “direct primary has had a
14
noticeably bad effect upon this office.”
The election of prosecutors affects the quality of the attorneys who
hold the position. Competent members of the bar are unwilling to
undergo the “ordeal” of nomination, and the voters—at least those in
“the ordinary large city”—are in no position to judge the professional
15
qualifications of the candidates. As a result, political machines rather
than voters are the true gatekeepers to the ranks of prosecutors: they
are chosen based on the “exigencies of political organizations rather
16
than with reference to the tasks of law enforcement.”
The report equates this “political” environment with outright
corruption. Criminal organizations can bribe prosecutors through the
electoral process because “[c]ampaign funds are derived from what
17
amounts to licensed violations of law.” The prosecutor is easy for
political organizations to control while remaining out of sight: “Thus the
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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prosecutor’s office, with its enormous power of preventing prosecutions
from getting to trial, its lack of organization, its freedom from central
18
control, and its ill-defined responsibility, is a great political prize.”
The opportunities for corruption multiply in a world where trials are
disappearing. The key power of the prosecutor is the dismissal, which
goes unnoticed more often when dismissals and negotiated guilty pleas
19
are more common than trials.
Defense attorneys, in the view of the Wickersham Commission, are
the agents of this corruption. New prosecutors are “in no position to
20
cope with experienced and resourceful professional defenders.” The
“habitual practitioner in criminal cases [has] connection with local
politics [and the ability to pressure] those whose political tenure is
21
uncertain and dependent upon politics.” The “habitual defenders of
criminals” learn that the nolle prosequi power exercised by assistant
prosecutors who answer to no responsible organization “lends itself to
22
the quiet choking off of prosecutions under political influence.”
The association of elections with local corruption was familiar
territory for reform-minded professionals of the era. For more than a
generation, the Progressive agenda pursued electoral reforms to limit
the occasions for voters to direct government functions; these reforms
included the city manager form of government (endorsed as an
alternative to mayoral elections), the short ballot, and other measures
designed to insulate expert public administrators from uninformed
23
voters.

18. Id.
19. See id. at 11, 15. While many commenters of the day treated plea negotiations as an
illegitimate method to dispose of criminal charges, the Commission took no position on the
necessity or desirability of guilty pleas. See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases,
1 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927); Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97
(1928).
20. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 13.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 19, 21.
23. See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV.
11, 21–22 (1997) (discussing the use of short ballots); Richard J. Stillman II, The City
Manager: Professional Helping Hand, or Political Hired Hand?, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 659
(1977) (discussing city manager form of government); Larry Walker, Woodrow Wilson,
Progressive Reform, and Public Administration, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 509, 516, 523 (1989)
(referencing the short ballot).
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B. Creation of Genuine Accountability
A second benefit of centralizing local prosecutors into a single state
organization relates to transparency. Centralization promotes true
accountability by creating visible lines of responsibility for routine
matters within an organization. Prosecutors who answer to their
supervisors at the state level bypass the murkier influences of the local
power structure. When a prosecutor drops a case against a privileged
defendant, those who object can make a more well-informed direct
appeal to voters; even better, they can ask for rational bureaucratic
action within the prosecutor’s office.
Prosecutors who do not answer to the local electorate are less
inclined to throw up distracting and spectacular cases to confuse voters
about their actions in more routine cases. A system of frequent
elections “does not so much require that the work of the prosecutor be
24
carried out efficiently as that it be carried out conspicuously.” Given
this “desire for publicity and the fear of offending those who control
local politics, the temptation” for an elected prosecutor is to create an
“ineffective perfunctory routine for everyday cases with spectacular
25
treatment of sensational cases.”
The short terms of office that are available to prosecutors who face
frequent elections (while receiving low salaries) keep the local offices
disorganized. Simply put, there is no time to organize the office
adequately. And without proper organization and records, the public
26
cannot have “definitely located responsibility.” The many assistants
have no clearly defined powers and duties. A larger statewide
organization, with a rational bureaucratic structure and defined powers,
allows the public to see more clearly where the blame lies when a
prosecutorial decision goes badly.
C. Application of Expertise
A third benefit of a centralized prosecutorial service, according to
the Wickersham Commission, is that it enables prosecutors to apply
their expertise, particularly to achieve the rehabilitative treatment of the
27
offender—the central goal of criminal justice. With stable leadership, a
prosecutorial service can make the assistants permanent and remove
24.
25.
26.
27.

REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 15.
Id.
See id. at 12–13.
Id. at 5.

16 WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

1206

6/23/2013 11:12 AM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:1199

political patronage from the hiring process. Greater stability allows for
28
accumulation of experience, specialization, and a division of labor.
In the view of the Commission, the primary aim of public agencies
dealing with crime is “to discover the offender at an age and time when
he may still be in the formative stage as regards his personality and
character and to apply to each individual case that disposition or
treatment which fits that individual’s problem and gives promise of the
29
desired results.” Rehabilitation requires a long-term perspective and
the patience to monitor the offender’s progress throughout the
treatment. Such a long-term perspective is easier to attain when
assistants remain on the job for longer periods, have clearer
30
assignments, and have better record-keeping routines.
This faith in the expertise of a stable bureaucracy was a staple of
31
reformist thinking at the time. In 1938, James Landis (a Frankfurter
student and successor to Roscoe Pound as Dean of Harvard Law
School) published his influential book, The Administrative Process; it
was the high-water mark of faith in scientific expertise as a guide and
32
source of legitimacy for administrative action.
D. Responsiveness to Changing Threats and Conditions
Another benefit of centralized prosecutors discussed in the
Wickersham Commission report is adaptability to modern conditions,
especially the changing needs of criminal justice in large cities.
Decentralized local prosecution may have been appropriate for a
pioneer rural society, but a fragmented prosecutorial service is ill suited
to “the great urban industrial centers and unified country of to-day”
33
where law and order are much more than a local concern.
In the formative era of the nation, it was appropriate to address fears
about centralized governmental power. But after a long period of
urbanization, an overly decentralized prosecutorial service may be
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 12. In local offices, responsibility for conducting prosecutions may fall
between “a corps of more or less independent assistants with no record to show exactly who
did what” in an ineffective presentation of case between outgoing and incoming prosecutor
and assistants. Id. at 14.
31. See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614
(1927).
32. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675–78 (1975).
33. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 11.
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“quite as bad,” given the modern conditions of transportation and
facilities for the coming and going of organized crime. The “State is as
34
Centralized
natural a unit as the county or town was a century ago.”
organization of prosecutors became one piece of the Commission’s
overall reform program to streamline antiquated criminal procedures
that were no longer useful in a more complex industrial society. The
Commission catalogued the various points in the process where
“mitigating devices” designed in other eras created discretionary power
to dismiss or block prosecutions, making them subject to the “pressure
35
of politics.” These outmoded mitigating devices included a preliminary
hearing before a magistrate, grand jury indictment, the general verdict
after trial, judicial discretion at sentencing, a motion in mitigation after
36
sentence, and the executive power of pardon.
E. State Versus Federal Centralization
In light of the benefits of removing prosecutors from local electoral
control and placing them into a larger, more stable and rational
bureaucracy, did the Wickersham Commission therefore endorse the
federalization of criminal prosecution? Many other volumes of the
Commission’s reports detailed the ill effects of an expanded federal
37
presence in criminal enforcement. It is not surprising, then, that the
Commission preferred state government control over prosecution rather
than federal involvement.
The Commission explored in great detail the recent and remarkable
38
It treated the
expansion of federal criminal law enforcement.
newfound federal role as a natural response to a dysfunctional system,
39
and as a stopgap measure. It is little wonder, the report opines, that
“more than one large city” now relies on the federal prosecuting
40
Federal criminal
machinery to maintain local law and order.
legislation can even reach larcenies and receipt of stolen property.
Some states at one time enforced their own prohibition laws, but now
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21–22.
See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON THE CHILD OFFENDER IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE (1931); NAT’L COMM’N ON
LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
DEPORTATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931); PROHIBITION REPORT, supra note 8.
38. See REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 16.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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they leave this enforcement to federal authorities. 41
This is all
understandable, given the failure of local prosecution to adapt to
current challenges. But it is not sustainable, given the dislocation and
unanticipated failures that come from a larger federal presence.
In the end, the Commission recommended a transplantation of the
42
federal model of a centralized prosecutorial service to the state level.
The Commission acknowledged that at the time of the report, some
state criminal systems allowed the state Attorney General to prosecute
43
some cases upon the local prosecutor’s failure to enforce state laws.
The report, however, treated this as a “crude substitute” for central
44
The
control of prosecution “beyond the reach of local politics.”
removal power reached so few cases that it left the shortcomings of local
control untouched.
A more complete shift of power to the state level was necessary.
The Attorney General of each state should assume control for a single
prosecutorial organization, with the power to set policy and make caselevel determinations for prosecutions around the state. A “director of
public prosecutions” with secure tenure and defined responsibility
45
would offer “systematized control of prosecutions in [the] [s]tate.”
Local offices would be staffed by long-term assistant prosecutors with
46
This structure emphasizes
clearly defined duties and specialties.
expertise and bureaucratic accountability rather than frequent elections;
additionally, it prizes “good government” over prosecutors who are
47
“amenable to public opinion.”
III. SELECTIVE CENTRALIZATION
The Wickersham Commission Report on Prosecution did not trigger
widespread changes in practice. Certain parts of the Commission’s
output, including its report on policing and its survey of changes in
federal criminal enforcement, gained attention and remained topics of
conversation and interest for many years. 48 The Report on Prosecution,
41. Id.
42. See id. at 37–38.
43. See id. at 14.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 38.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. See WALKER, supra note 6, at 154–55; Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack
Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2013); David Alan Sklansky, Police and
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however, faded out of sight quickly.
The Report on Prosecution is sometimes noted in historical accounts
of the development of the American prosecutor’s role, both for its
49
general description of the importance of prosecutorial discretion, and
for its recognition of the growing importance of plea negotiations in
50
The report also gets mentioned because of its
criminal practice.
observation that prosecutors’ offices are designed for accountability to
51
voters. The report periodically receives attention on the peripheral
52
topic of streamlining procedures like grand jury indictments. But as
for the report’s central programmatic recommendation—shifting control
of the prosecutor’s office from the local level to a director of public
prosecutions at the state level—the response has been the sound of
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1730 (2005); Franklin E. Zimring, The Accidental
Crime Commission: Its Legacies and Lessons, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 995 (2013).
49. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 452–53 (2001); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial
Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1265 n.82 (2011); Bennett L. Gershman, “Hard Strikes
and Foul Blows:” Berger v. United States 75 Years After, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 187–89
(2010); Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor’s Discretionary Power, THE PROSECUTOR,
Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 25, 26–27; Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 728–31 (1996); John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A
Historical and Comparative Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 3, 8 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (noting
report’s discussion of growth in prosecutorial power); Wayne A. Logan, Comment, A
Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
1695, 1704 (1990).
50. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31
(1979); Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in
THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 177, 182–83 (John L. Worrall & M.
Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (summarizing Commission’s view of plea bargaining as
an indication of inadequately trained prosecutors or “political interference”); Jerold H. Israel,
Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV.
761, 769 (1996) (discussing prosecutor caseloads); Donald J. Newman, Pleading Guilty for
Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 780,
781 (1956); Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The
American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 53–54 (1992) (critiquing the
Wickersham Report on Prosecution for its reflexively negative view of negotiated pleas).
51. See Shelby A. Dickerson Moore, Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial
Charging Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion—Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line, 60 LA. L. REV. 371, 375 & nn.34–35 (2000); Jonas A.
Myhre, Conviction Without Trial in the United States and Norway: A Comparison, 5 HOUS. L.
REV. 647, 656 (1968) (citing the report for its recognition of connection between bargaining
practices and political context of prosecutor’s office).
52. See George H. Dession, From Indictment to Information—Implications of the Shift,
42 YALE L.J. 163, 163, 165 (1932); Theodore M. Kranitz, The Grand Jury: Past-Present-No
Future, 24 MO. L. REV. 318, 328–29 (1959).
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crickets. 53
On one level, this lack of impact is surprising. The report
crystallized a growing consensus among elite analysts of criminal justice
that traditional institutions of the criminal courts no longer performed
54
very well and that greater expertise could produce better results.
Drawing strength from over a decade of “surveys” of the criminal courts
55
in a wide range of cities and states, the Wickersham Commission
Report on Prosecution appeared to have a great deal of momentum.
While government commission reports virtually never cause policy
change by themselves, a report such as this one, which captures an
enduring and widespread consensus about a reform proposal, very often
amplifies a movement that produces real change.
On another level, the minimal impact of the Report on Prosecution
was predictable. The consensus among criminal justice experts only
56
reflected the views of elite insiders to the system. Efforts to remove
functions of government from popular control are typically more
57
appealing to experts than to the public at large. Just as the efforts to
remove judges from the electoral process achieved very little success
over the years, the effort to insulate prosecutors from the control of
local voters was always a quixotic cause.
The failure of the Wickersham Commission’s recommendations for
prosecutors is especially interesting when one notes that the shift from
53. See Newman F. Baker & Earl H. DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney and Reform in
Criminal Justice, 26 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 823 (1936) (noting that the
Wickersham recommendations were ignored); Robert B. Reich, Solving Social Crises by
Commissions, 3 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 254, 258 (1972–1973) (discussing how the
Wickersham report “vanished” from government discourse and how the ABA President in
1934 stated that the report “now gathers dust on the shelves of college libraries”); cf. Harold
J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 275, 289 (1989) (referring to the report as an unsuccessful executive effort to
centralize federal prosecution and law enforcement functions); Henry S. Ruth, Jr., To Dust
Ye Shall Return?, 43 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 811, 816–17, 820–21 (1968) (noting that
Wickersham argued for centralized prosecution systems at state level, but legislators and the
public disregarded the recommendation); Daniel L. Skoler & June M. Hetler, Governmental
Restructuring and Criminal Administration: The Challenge of Consolidation, 58 GEO. L.J. 719,
734 & nn. 67–69 (1969–1970) (noting that the Wickersham Commission called for
centralization, but few states follow the model).
54. See REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 3, 37–38.
55. Id at 3.
56. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012).
57. See Thurman W. Arnold, Apologia for Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L.J. 729, 747 (1935)
(mentioning Wickersham recommendation to remove politics from prosecutor selection, but
ultimately dismissing this suggestion as a common recommendation to improve government
functions).
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local to state control has succeeded in some other criminal justice
settings. In particular, state governments control two of the three major
courtroom actors, as judges and defense attorneys now answer to
58
state authorities more often than they did in decades past. With
prosecutors, however, local polities have remained in firm control.
A. Where State Influence Grew
The shift from local control to governance at the state level has been
noteworthy for criminal courts and judges. Early in the twentieth
59
century, a conglomeration of local courts heard criminal cases. These
courts, including Municipal Courts and Police Courts, were based on the
English precedent of a profusion of local courts with overlapping
60
jurisdictions. Specialized juvenile courts, family courts, and courts for
misdemeanor and ordinance violations operated separately, at least
from an organizational standpoint, from courts of general jurisdiction.
Reformers set out to prune this organic collection of courts,
61
The unified system
replacing them with “a unified court system.”
would eliminate overlapping jurisdictions, both geographical and subject
matter; adopt a hierarchical and centralized state court governance;
place the Chief Justice at the top of the system; operate under unitary
budgeting and finance at the state level; and create a single personnel
62
system, run by a state court administrator.
Roscoe Pound, a central figure in the Wickersham Commission, also
63
adopted the unified court system as one of his reformist projects.
Unlike state level control of prosecutors, his goals for unified court
systems bore fruit in many states. The American Bar Association and
58. See G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 92–96 (2012) (listing mechanisms for other
branches of state government to control the judiciary).
59. See BETTMAN, supra note 5, at 158–59.
60. See Mark H. Haller, Historical Roots of Police Behavior: Chicago, 1890–1925, 10
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 303, 308–09 (1976) (discussing the Police Courts and Municipal Courts
used in Chicago in the early twentieth century); R. Stanley Lowe, Unified Courts in America:
The Legacy of Roscoe Pound, 56 JUDICATURE 316, 316 (1973); Mary Roberts Smith, The
Social Aspect of New York Police Courts, 5 AM. J. SOC. 145, 146 (1899) (outlining the
structure of New York City Police Courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century).
61. See Larry C. Berkson, The Emerging Ideal of Court Unification, 60 JUDICATURE
372, 373–75 (1977).
62. See Geoff Gallas, The Conventional Wisdom of State Court Administration: A
Critical Assessment and an Alternative Approach, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 35, 35 (1976).
63. See Lowe, supra note 60; Roscoe Pound, Principles and Outline of a Modern Unified
Court Organization, 23 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 225, 225 (1940).
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other organizations of the legal establishment embraced the cause, 64 and
65
it took hold to various degrees in many states.
Today, while there are still many courts that are controlled and
funded at the local level, state government dominates the organization
and operation of criminal courts in most states. Compared to the
situation in 1931, courts today (even those with specialized missions
such as Drug Courts) operate within larger bureaucracies, answering to
a single coherent set of personnel policies, performance standards, and
66
disciplinary authorities. The shift from local control to state control
has produced more visible lines of authority and bureaucratic
accountability, just as the Wickersham Commission hoped.
A similar pattern applies to public defense attorneys. Some public
defender organizations began as local organizations, answerable to the
67
bar and the courts of major cities. Over time, prompted by changes in
the law regarding the government’s obligation to provide legal counsel
68
for indigent defendants, public defender offices spread to more
jurisdictions, including some smaller cities and rural areas. Some of
these offices are quite small, and certain legal specialties or support
functions are not available in every office. Thus, over time, some states
have merged local offices into statewide organizations to create
performance standards, training programs, and support functions for the
69
local public defender offices. At least some of the funding for these
offices still often comes from city or county government, but over time
70
more of the funding burden has migrated to the state level. The shift
64. STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORG. § 1 cmt. (1974) (introducing a chapter,
which discusses the position of the American Bar Association); Allan Ashman & Jeffrey A.
Parness, The Concept of a Unified Court System, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 2–3, 9–19 (1974).
65. See Larry Berkson, Unified Court Systems: A Ranking of the States, 3 JUST. SYS. J.
264, 275 tbl.5 (1977).
66. See generally Patricia M. Wald, Bureaucracy and the Courts, 92 Yale L.J. 1478 (1983).
67. See REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 30–32; see also PAUL B. WICE,
PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 30–31 (2005) (discussing the
“traditional” public defender programs in New York City and Cook County).
68. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S
335, 344–45 (1963).
69. See Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1525, 1535 (2011).
70. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 2,
available at http://will.state.wy.us/slpub/reports/Public%20Defender.pdf (showing that the
state funds 85% of the Wyoming Public Defender’s budget). Compare LYNN LANGTON &
DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
228229, State Public Defender Programs, 2007, at 4–5 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf (stating that in 2007, about 15% of state
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from local control to state control is becoming a reality for publicly
71
funded defense attorneys.
B. Where Local Control Persisted
While judges and public defense attorneys have morphed from local
organizations to state organizations, prosecutors have by and large
remained under local control. One can see this continuity through
several different measures.
First, think of the sheer number of prosecutors’ offices. In 1934,
72
there were 2,150 prosecuting attorneys in the United States. By 2005,
there were 2,344 prosecutors’ offices with jurisdiction over felony cases
73
in state court. While many of those offices have grown a great deal
74
over the years, we have not seen any large-scale consolidation of
prosecutor offices since the days of the Wickersham Commission.
Next, consider the selection process for the chief prosecutor in each
of those offices. As of 1934, forty-six of the forty-eight states chose their
75
chief prosecuting attorneys at the city, county, or district level. Only
Rhode Island and Connecticut provided for governance of prosecutors
judicial and legal expenditures went to public defender offices and the average state public
defender program had a budget of about $33 million), with DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., & LYNN
LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 231175, Countybased and Local Public Defender Offices, 2007, at 4 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf (noting that in 2007, county-based public
defender offices had a budget of about $708,000).
71. That is not to say that the Wickersham Commission endorsed public defenders
controlled at the state level. REPORT ON PROSECUTION, supra note 1, at 31–32. The
Commission only expressed a tepid interest in public defenders and did not endorse this
delivery model over the appointment of individual lawyers. Id. at 33. This is surprising, given
the Commission’s views about the corruption at work among “habitual defenders” of
criminals; the logic of removal from local control to address the ill effects of political
influence would seem to apply to defenders as much as to prosecutors. Id. at 19.
72. See Newman F. Baker & Earl H. DeLong, The Prosecuting Attorney and His Office,
25 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 695, 696 (1934–1935) (excluding county attorneys
in states with district attorneys from the count of prosecuting attorneys).
73. See STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, US DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NCJ 213799, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf.
74. See Wright, supra note 69, at 1522–23 (noting that in 2001, the average small
prosecutor’s office has ten staff members, while the largest offices have an average of 440
staff members). In 1934, Baker and DeLong estimated that “at least three-fourths of the
offices in the United States contain less than ten persons and only a small number indeed will
have more than twenty-five.” Baker & DeLong, supra note 72, at 696.
75. See Baker & DeLong, supra note 72, at 696–97 (noting that thirty states select
prosecuting attorneys at the county or city level, while sixteen select them at the district or
county level).
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at the state level. 76 By 1969, only five states (now including Alaska,
Delaware, and New Jersey) placed responsibility for criminal
77
prosecutions at the state rather than the local level. Today, these same
five states continue to select and control prosecutors at the state level,
78
while forty-five keep the traditional local governance model.
This negligible movement toward a state governance model took
place in an atmosphere of strong elite consensus favoring state control.
A continuing endorsement of the Wickersham Commission proposal
took the form of a “Model Department of Justice Act,” created in 1952
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
79
and a special American Bar Association Committee. The Model Act
declared that the state attorney general should supervise the prosecuting
attorneys of the state, promulgate uniform enforcement policies, and
provide assistance in particular cases at the request of local
80
prosecutors. The same sentiment appeared in the landmark report of
President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
81
Administration of Justice. The first edition of the ABA’s Standards
for Criminal Justice in 1970 also embraced the concept of state
governance, although the standards allowed for some flexibility in how
82
the statewide integration of prosecutors would happen. In the end, this
76. See id. at 697.
77. See Skoler & Hetler, supra note 53, at 734 n.69 (listing Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode
Island). I retain Connecticut in this group because its legal status did not change between the
Baker and DeLong survey of 1934 and the Skoker and Hetler listing in 1969. See CONN.
CONST. art. IV, § 27 (providing for the appointment of state’s attorneys for each judicial
district by a commission composed of gubernatorial appointees, including judges, which was
added to Connecticut’s Constitution in 1984, CONN. CONST. amend. art. XIV); Adams v.
Rubinow, 251 A.2d 49, 59 n.4 (Conn. 1968) (noting the practice of judicial appointment of
state’s attorneys in Connecticut). An amendment to the New Jersey Constitution in 1947
provided that county prosecutors are “nominated and appointed by the Governor with the
advice and consent of the Senate,” for five-year terms. N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 2, cl. 1.
78. See Skoler & Hetler, supra note 53 and accompanying text.
79. MODEL DEP’T OF JUSTICE ACT (1952).
80. Id. §§ 1, 7.
81. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 148–49 (1967) (recommending that increased
State government involvement will lead to uniform policies of law enforcement and
procedure, and noting how such a recommendation is similar to those of the Wickersham
Commission and the American Bar Association Model State Department of Justice Act);
HENRY RUTH & KEVIN R. REITZ, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME: RETHINKING OUR
RESPONSE 47–48 (2003) (discussing how the Johnson Commission called for a better
knowledge and information assessment system in criminal prosecution).
82. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEF.
FUNCTION §§ 2.1–.10 (Tentative Draft 1970).
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long-term advocacy at the highest levels of the profession amounted to
very little change in governance of prosecutors.
Putting aside the governance of prosecutors’ offices in routine
criminal matters, there are certain specialized subjects that the states
have placed in the hands of state-level prosecutors, normally in the
83
office of the Attorney General. These areas include public corruption,
election fraud, federal benefits fraud, environmental crimes, antitrust
84
They also have
crimes, securities violations, and tax violations.
authority over cases that present conflicts of interest for the local
85
Typically,
prosecutor or that involve multi-jurisdictional crimes.
statutes also allow the local prosecutor to request support from the state
in designated cases, based on Wickersham-friendly criteria such as the
86
need for expertise or insulation from the local political structure.
The statutory authority for state-level prosecution in these areas—
sometimes displacing local authority and sometimes complementing it—
has grown somewhat over the years. But this legal authority has
historically produced only a small number of cases; assessments from
87
1934 and 1977 indicate low levels of usage. The same remains true
88
today.
Next, consider the question of local or state control of prosecution
from the vantage point of who is spending the money and supervising
the employees. We have reasonably consistent expenditure numbers
89
since 1982, the last three decades of the post-Wickersham period. It is
difficult to distinguish spending on prosecution from spending on other
aspects of criminal adjudication. It is possible, however, to compare
adjudication expenses to police and corrections spending.
83. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from
the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 545 (2011).
84. See id. at 545–48.
85. Id. at 549–50.
86. Id. at 546–55.
87. See Earl H. DeLong, Powers and Duties of the State Attorney-General in Criminal
Prosecution, 25 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358, 395 (1934) (concluding that as of
1934, there had been “negligible” participation by attorneys general in conducting
prosecutions of their own); NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. COMM’N ON THE OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GEN., POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 107 (1977) (noting that in 1977, attorney generals infrequently initiated
prosecutions).
88. See Barkow, supra note 83, at 552–56.
89. See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 236218, Justice Expenditures and Employment, FY 1982–2007—Statistical
Tables (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf.
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During this time, it appears that spending shifted more than
employment at different levels of government. In general, local
government’s share of criminal justice employment remained almost
90
unchanged, while its share of expenditures dropped a small amount.
This could have happened either because state and federal governments
awarded grants or other transfer payments to local government, or
because expenditures per employee increased more slowly in the local
systems. For instance, in the category of judicial and legal services, local
government employment levels have decreased at a lower rate than
91
local expenditures. As Table 1 indicates, for the period 1982–2009,
local expenditures moved down by 9.4%, but local employment only
92
moved down by 3.4%.
Table 1: Local, State, and Federal Shares of Spending On Criminal
Adjudication, Policing, and Corrections: 1982–2009 (%)
1982

1987

1992

1997

2002

2009

Change

Judicial
and
Legal
Services
Local Expenditures
State Expenditures
Federal Expenditures

49.4
34.1
16.4

49.7
32.8
17.5

48.2
31.5
20.3

46.7
30.6
22.7

42.2
36.3
21.5

40.0
38.0
22.0

-9.4
+3.9
+5.6

Local Employment
State Employment
Federal Employment

56.2
32.2
11.5

56.5
32.1
11.4

56.0
30.4
13.6

54.3
33.1
12.6

54.1
33.7
12.2

52.8
35.3
12.0

-3.4
+3.1
+0.5

Police
Local Expenditures
State Expenditures
Federal Expenditures

75.4
13.2
11.4

73.7
12.8
13.6

72.3
12.1
15.6

71.9
11.7
16.4

70.0
12.4
17.5

67.0
10.1
22.9

-8.4
-3.1
+11.5

79.7
10.1
10.2

80.2

79.3
10.4
10.3

76.4

-5.2
-1.8
+7.0

Local Employment
State Employment
Federal Employment

81.6
10.7
7.7

79.8
11.0
9.2

9.9
9.9

8.9
14.7

90. See id. at 5 tbl.1, 7 tbl.7.
91. Id. at 5 tbl.2, 7 tbl.9.
92. Id. at 5 tbl.3, 6 tbls.4 & 5, 7 tbl.9, & 8 tbls.10 & 11; TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 237913, Justice Expenditure and
Employment Extracts, 2009—Preliminary, tbls.1 & 2 (2012), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4335 (follow “Comma-delimited format
(CSV)” hyperlink; then open “jeee09p01” & “jeee09p02” files).
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Corrections
Local Expenditures
State Expenditures
Federal Expenditures
Local Employment
State Employment
Federal Employment

33.1
61.8
5.1
35.2
61.5
3.4

33.6
61.3
5.1
34.1
62.9
3.1

32.8
59.8
7.4
34.4
61.4
4.2

29.7
62.7
7.6
31.1
64.7
4.2

30.7
61.8
7.5
33.2
62.2
4.6

33.3
57.9
8.8
34.6
60.8
4.6

+0.2
-3.9
+3.7
-0.6
-0.7
+1.2

Local governments lost a few police jobs (down by 5.2%) and state
governments did not make up the difference, as they too lost police jobs
(down by 1.8%). The big story for policing appears to be the growing
federal presence, both for expenditures and for employment. Finally, in
the category of corrections expenditures and employment, there is
almost no movement in the local share of corrections spending or
93
employment.
These expenditure figures, covering only the last three decades of
the post-Wickersham period, suggest only a modest shift in control away
from the local level when it comes to policing and adjudication, while
the local role in corrections remains unchanged.
Despite the
Wickersham Commission’s articulation of a stable elite consensus in
favor of centralized state control, criminal justice remains today, as it
was in 1931, a function of local government.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE STAYING POWER OF LOCAL CONTROL
What might we make of this modest trend line, this non-event over
the decades after the advocacy of the Wickersham Commission? The
persistence of local control over the prosecutor’s office might be a
political economy story. Legislators from the local district want
prosecutors who see things as their constituents do. Voters who are
content with criminal law enforcement are less inclined to replace
incumbents (including incumbent legislators) with challengers on
Election Day. When local demographics and priorities change, district
boundaries need to change as well. Thus, legislators want prosecutors
94
answering to the same public that they do.
93. Here the federal government has displaced some state-level spending; the federal
share of employment in the corrections category remains steadier.
94. See Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutor Services of North
Carolina, in 41 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 214–16 (Michael Tonry ed.,
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The persistent local flavor of criminal prosecution also suggests that
state actors are not too worried about local corruption. Indeed, our
conception of unseemly “political” influence has changed in the criminal
95
justice world over the decades. The political issue that worried the
Wickersham Commission was improper responsiveness to local political
leaders, not to voters. The political issue that worries elites today is
improper responsiveness to “bloodthirsty” voters.
Perhaps a changing media landscape has neutralized the
Wickersham Commission concerns about prosecutors who are overly
sensitive to the wishes of other local officials. Local prosecutors might
be reluctant to file charges in police misconduct cases, but they appear
to have every political incentive to prosecute cases against the politically
powerful. Such prominent cases reliably become part of the next
96
election campaign if the prosecutor handles them badly.
Similarly, the Wickersham Commission’s concerns about the small
scale and attendant lack of specialized expertise in the local prosecutor’s
office no longer seem to apply. Although the number of local offices
remains as high as ever, the median size of the prosecutor’s office has
97
Clearer job descriptions and lines of
grown over the years.
responsibility are now common in local prosecutors’ offices. Improved
data management makes it possible to monitor individual prosecutor
choices as they happen, or to audit them after the fact.
Moreover, in those settings where more specialized legal skills are
important (for instance, for arson or child sex abuse crimes), statewide
professional organizations of prosecutors now offer training and
networking for attorneys who handle these cases at the local level. For
those unusual cases where the local prosecutor has no time or interest in
developing the needed expertise through these networking
opportunities, assignment of special counsel from the State Attorney
General can remedy the problem. The development of joint law
2012) (discussing changes in prosecutorial district boundaries over time to “reflect the
preferences of local politicians for electoral control over district attorneys”).
95. For discussions of the variety of functions that the notion of “accountability” can
serve, see Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 30–31 (1997); Edward Rubin, Hyperdepoliticization, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 631,
633, 659, 669 (2012); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2097 (2005); Note, Deweyan Democracy and the
Administrative State, 125 HARV. L. REV. 580, 580–82 (2011).
96. See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
582, 602 (2009).
97. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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enforcement task forces also puts specialized skills into the district when
necessary.
The persistence of local control might also tell us about the power of
legal standards—as compared with other forms of organizational
control—to prevent abuse of authority. The elite consensus embodied
in the Wickersham Commission was modestly successful in moving
courts (but not prosecutors) away from local control. Apparently, the
uniform legal standards that judges must apply, combined with
consistent statewide ethical norms for judges, bureaucratic rules about
assignment of cases, and norms for advancement within the judicial
profession, were adequate replacements for tight political control and
funding of the courts at the local level. General legal standards and
bureaucratic monitoring performed better than the ballot box to achieve
the kind of judging that the public demanded.
On the other hand, the Wickersham Commission’s call for a shift
from local to state control of prosecutors went nowhere. Legal
standards and statewide bureaucratic controls have not displaced local
political control over the prosecutor. Consistency in the application of
state law matters little to voters when it comes to prosecutorial charging
and resolution of cases; indeed, the public seems to prefer inconsistency.
They want prosecutors to tailor the broad reach of the criminal code to
fit local priorities. It appears that the expertise that counts for
prosecutors is knowledge about local priorities for public safety. What
worries local voters? So long as local prosecutors know how to answer
that, they won’t be losing influence to the state capital.

